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Civic integration programmes for migrants and newcomers were first enunciated in 
1998 in the Netherlands. As a result the Dutch civic integration policy quickly became a 
“model for Europe” (Michalowski, 2004). It was a response to the obvious failure of 
Europe’s policy to create a multicultural society (Joppke, 2007a) where cultural 
differences are not dominant. However during the last decennium these civic integration 
programmes were significantly influenced by a wave of ‘islamisation’ and used to 
confine this influence of Islam on western societies and traditional cultures. In the 
public opinion resistance grew against the Muslims who were held responsible for the 
undermining of basic values in western society, such as individualism and secularism, 
or classic liberties and civic rights (Quayle & Sonn, 2009; Entzinger, 2006, p. 127). 
In this article I analyse the reasons for the abovementioned shift and the backgrounds of 
the reduction that converts nearly all migrants – the old as well as the new - into 
Muslims. At the same time I want to emphasize the importance of adult education 
workers to bear this social policy context in mind.  
 
In a first phase I take a look at what precedes the civic integration programmes of the 
second millennium. What’s the connection between multiculturalism and civic 
integration? Subsequently I examine the ways in which the strong rules of the civic 
integration programmes have been made acceptable within the liberal democracies of 
Western Europe. 
To conclude I want to put forward some reasons why the civic integration programmes 
of today focus on the group of Muslim migrants. 
 
 
 
 
From multiculturalism to civic integration 
 The arrival of Islam in Western Europe is connected with the history of the guest 
workers at the end of the 1960s. Especially Moroccan and Turkish migrants were then 
drawn to the Netherlands and Belgium. A massive group of Turks also went to 
Germany where today there number has grown to approximately 1,8 million. France in 
turn received a lot of Maghreb from its former colonies and nowadays the Moroccan 
population consists of almost half a million people just as much as the Algerians 
(Eurostat, 2009). During this first period only the men came for a limited period of time 
to fill up the temporary labour shortage. As their stay was supposed to be temporary, no 
attention was given to any form of integration. They lived isolated, and as a 
consequence their living patterns remained inconspicuous. It was only after it became 
clear that these migrants were going to stay for much longer, that many workers brought 
in their families. This was facilitated by the various Laws on Family Reunion within the 
respective immigration countries. It was then, at the end of the 1970s, but even more in 
the 1990s, that the existence of a Muslim community became obvious. By then most 
Muslims had settled in the impoverished quarters of the 19th century city districts. The 
Arabic language, the typical dress codes, tea-bars and the first mosques were 
characteristic ingredients of those immigrant neighbourhoods.   
 
Very soon we assumed that this group of people also identified themselves as ‘Arabs’, 
and later as ‘Muslims’. But ‘the’ Muslim community as such does not exist (Scheffer, 
2007, p. 174). On the contrary, it is an ethnically and religiously diverse group. There is 
more than just the Turks next to the Moroccans or the Algerians. Moreover each of 
these communities is in itself highly divided as not everybody originates from the exact 
same region in the home country. In one and the same city there is not ‘one’ Turkish, 
Moroccan or Algerian community, but we can observe various concentrations of people 
originating from the same region or village in respectively Turkey, Morocco or Algeria. 
All these groups have very little in common.  
 
 
 
Separateness 
 At the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s a multicultural approach was mainstream 
in the migration policy of West European countries. The migrants were labelled as 
ethnic minorities. They were acknowledged as one community separate from the 
majority. They were approached as minority groups that were in need of selective 
support in respect to employment, housing, education and health care.  
Social and cultural workers promoted equal treatment and encouraged ‘emancipation’. 
In a number of areas they provided institutional arrangements that ran parallel to 
existing mainstream arrangements in the various countries (Entzinger, 2006, p. 124). On 
the one hand, the special characteristics of the migrant cultures served to justify such 
forms of separateness that aimed to emphasize the cultural identity of the new 
communities. They offered opportunities, accommodation and adjusted features to 
develop their way of life connected to their homeland (Toonen, 2000; Joppke, 2004, pp. 
243-245). On the other hand social and cultural workers stimulated equal treatment of 
the migrant population in society. They promoted an ideological approach which 
minimized the differences, or, in so far as we were confronted with differences, they 
urged the need for mutual respect and to try to use elements of other cultures in our 
daily life to make it symbolically richer. Multiculturalism means that there are no 
different cultures existing next to each other, but that there is only one culture made up 
like a patchwork with elements from various ‘old’ cultures. 
 
This presupposed integration path for migrants was similar to the one that had worked 
in the past with regards to the religious and ideological ‘pillars’ in some West-European 
countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Therefore, this approach applied to the new 
migrant population, in order to create separate facilities based upon community 
identities, was not new (Wintle, 2000; Entzinger, 2006, p. 123; Scheffer, pp. 170-173). 
After the Second World War the welfare state developed basically in such way that 
different religious and ideological communities within the society had their own 
institutional arrangements, such as schools, hospitals, social support agencies, 
newspapers, trade unions, political parties and even broadcasting organisations for radio 
and television (Toonen, 2000; Entzinger, 2006, p. 123). Each community or ‘pillar’, i.e. 
Catholic, Protestant or liberal, socialist and humanist set up its own institutions. The 
role of the state was to establish political structures that guaranteed equality between all 
pillars. The state unified the different communities through the elites of the various 
pillars who decided about structural possibilities. The central attitude for all pillars was 
to respect the others in their authenticity. This means that every community could 
independently elaborate the emancipation of its own members. The government divided 
the available means in proponent ways, but remained itself neutral. Within their 
institutions the communities made their own decisions. They worked for their own 
party, their own community that was designed within the framework of a separate 
religious or ideological identity. The society in general was made up of a collection of 
different pillars, whereas in daily life the communities existed separated from each 
other. 
 
Since the 1970s the impact of ‘pillarization’ has decreased spectacularly. Secularisation, 
individualisation, the rising level of schooling, the restricted role of the nation state and 
the growing impact of globalization, all have undermined the stability of the former so 
called closed and established communities. Nonetheless the particular circumstances of 
migrants gave them specific place within the new society, thereby following the pre-
existing model of ‘pillarization’. The migrants were subject to living conditions that 
were incomparable with those of the native majority as their education level was low, 
they suffered from bad housing conditions as well as a lack of adjusted leadership. All 
those elements were of the same order as those that had laid the foundations for the 
emancipation movements after the Second World War. The framework of ‘pillarization’ 
had to allow this separate group of migrants the possibility to integrate in the new 
society in accordance with the norms of their own religious and cultural identity. This 
accepted form of autonomy gave the native majority the advantage of not having to take 
great pains over integration. Most people assumed that integration would happen 
automatically. 
Moreover, in the beginning of the 1980s, many believed that the difficulty of dealing 
with major differences in reference towards migrants, could be simply overcome by 
conceiving the ‘otherness’ as a welcome surplus value. It was exactly at that time that 
the foundation for the development of a multicultural society was established (Joppke, 
2007b, p. 4). And it was the model of ‘pillarization’ that offered the best opportunities 
to this purpose. It depended on the freedom of the communities to build bridges of their 
own account. The migrant communities were able to set up an institutional development 
that would be parallel to the already existing social institutions. Mutual respect justified 
a considerable degree of separation. At the same time, social workers developed 
programmes within the social-cultural sphere in order to create connections between the 
native and the allochthonous population. The multicoloured dimension of 
multiculturalism was supposed to be an added value to society as a whole. 
 
However at the start of the 1990s guest workers as well as foreigners in general were 
increasingly seen as the scapegoats by extreme right-winged movements all over 
Europe. Initially the model of the multicultural society could still counterbalance the 
emerging racial contrasts, the climate of intolerance whereby the guest workers 
themselves were held responsible for the problems related to unemployment, 
ghettoization and unsafety in the large cities. Yet the model could not hold. At the end 
of the 1990s it became apparent that the multiculturalism had failed. It was the historian 
Paul Scheffer in the Netherlands who published in 2000 his controversial article The 
Multicultural Tragedy. The large group of North African migrants lived a life at the 
edge of the western culture and it didn’t look in any way that they were even prepared 
to change their situation on their own initiative. The emancipation of the migrant 
community has not managed to obtain the results hoped-for. During the last thirty years 
the Moroccans, Turks and Algerians were not able to develop into a community of 
equal value. On the contrary, despite all efforts they remained socially and economically 
subordinated. Moreover, it appears they could not withstand the pressure of the labour 
market and the globalized economy. Their lower schooling rates, which particularly 
involves the second generation, was jointly responsible for the high unemployment 
figure since the 1980s. Although they were offered various means to develop an specific 
existence within the West-European society, it didn’t produce the expected results. The 
support to equal treatment had rather confirmed their inequality, despite the ideology of 
multiculturalism. The model of ‘pillarization’ had failed.  
 
For a long time the migrants issue was believed to dissolve gradually and automatically, 
but the failure of multiculturalism opened the eyes of many policy makers: suddenly it 
was established that in reality Western Europe had sheltered migrants in an atmosphere 
of hostility, for as long as three decades. All of a sudden migration policy was elevated 
to a high priority, and immigrant integration has shifted from a marginal issue to one of 
the central challenges of the European Union. Drastic interventions were thought to be 
needed. 
 
Until then an important aspect of the multicultural integration model implied that the 
entire responsibility of this matter was in the hands the receiving nation state. To some 
extent the guest workers were considered a kind of victims as a consequence of western 
economic interests. They had to leave their familiar environment behind in order to start 
over completely in a foreign continent. It is this consciousness of guilt that was 
embedded in the multicultural model and that deprived migrants of all responsibility. 
The equilibrium became one side balanced.     
This balance is particularly important for finding of failure in multiculturalism. A 
sudden shift of emphasis appeared: the guest workers were no longer the welcome 
‘guests’, but they had moved from foreign countries to the west because they had 
voluntarily chosen to do so. In these circumstances they could no longer automatically 
lay claim on equal citizenship, unless they really deserved it, unless they could prove 
their ability to full membership. As a result of this total turnaround opposed to the 
former period, the full responsibility was now entirely given to these very migrants. The 
‘hospitable’ society only needed to give the migrants access, as far as those complied 
with the legal (values and) norms.  
 
Institutional integration 
 
The above turnabout was established by the setting up of the Civic Integration 
Programmes in the Netherlands in 1998 (Joppke, 2007a, p. 249). This Dutch model was 
soon used as a clear-cut example for the rest of Europe. First ‘old’ and ‘new’ migrants 
became forced to attend language classes, as speaking the native language of the host 
society was required as this was indispensable in order to find a job in the regular labour 
market. The multicultural approach had brought about the isolation of minorities instead 
of integration in the mainstream society. In the Netherlands civic integration was the 
answer to the obvious failure of multicultural policy in a country that had been, for a 
long time, at the top of European tolerance norm and of antidiscrimination. The Dutch 
migrant policy shifted from a focus of distance and respect to promoting the 
immigrants’ social participation by means of institutional integration. The obligatory 
character of civil integration was justified to inhemce the socioeconomic integration of 
immigrants and their offspring. Immigration policy started focussing on the availability 
of jobs. This was a striking turnabout in the integration policy. Migrants were no longer 
offered chances in a non engaging manner, instead they became ‘obliged’. 
 
Assimilation 
 
The neoliberal dominance of the free market determines the principles of the social 
politics (Joppke, 2007b, pp. 14-16). The old migrants, but even more empathically the 
newcomers, do not meet the demands and wishes of the labour market. North-African 
migrants of the first generation, and even those of the second generation, remain 
unskilled and display high rates of unemployment. From a neoliberal point of view 
potential workers are worth just as much as they can achieve and that is why their 
abilities are limited in the labour market. At the same time the pressure of the populist 
extreme right-wing politicians has even increased. They oppose the presence of 
migrants and set the nation against the Muslims who they hold responsible for 
undermining of the western culture. The immigration politics have intensified the 
control on illegal immigration. Migrant neighbourhoods have became increasingly a 
target towards security and criminality. The migration within the framework of family 
reunification has particularly turned into a topic of discussion. Moreover, the large 
majority of newcomers are still asylum seekers, especially those who apply for a 
reunification of the family. Turkish, Moroccan and Algerian people massively search 
for a wedding partner in their country of origin. 
 
Migrants are now entirely responsible for their own integration; they have to make the 
effort themselves as well as supplying proof that they can be equal citizens. To follow 
language courses was the first step. The pressure on migrants has become so intensive 
that nowadays these very migrants have to register for the integration courses and are 
even held responsible for the payment of those courses. In particular, the acquisition of 
the host country’s values and norms and a thorough insight into the daily living habits, 
became fixed parts of the civic integration programme (Carrera, 2006, p. 11; Joppke, 
2007b, p. 2). Immigrants who fail the tests are withheld permanent settlement 
permission. To renew their residence permits they need to pass the integration tests. 
This shaped the integration process in the direction of migration control and constituted 
a new vision on migration that brought assimilation into focus. The ability to integrate 
is the new standard or in other words, a lack of integration is taken as an acceptable 
ground to refuse admission as well as residence (Carrera, 2006, p. 6). Joppke considers 
the extreme turnaround in the Netherlands as reflected by the fact that ‘applicants for 
family reunification are required now to take an integration test at a Dutch embassy 
abroad in order to be granted a temporary residence permit’ (Joppke, 2007a, p. 250; 
Entzinger, 2006, p. 130)1. 
Also in Germany there is the obligation to integrate by means of language courses. In 
France many Algerians have the advantage of already speaking the French language. 
Therefore the civic integration policy there is less dominated by the acquisition of the 
native language. On the other hand the “Republican citizenship” which in France is 
considered as part of an ‘assimilation model’, has always had an explicit binding 
character (Mieri & Sala Pala, 2009, p. 385). Only after 2003 the Loi Sarkozy introduced 
drastic restrictions of the access to legal permanent residence and the then-year 
residence card. Even those persons who want to enter and live in France via the process 
of family reunification are now subject to these very restrictions (Joppke, 2007a, p. 
252).    
 
Civic integration and liberal democracy 
 
Christian Joppke analyses the duality in the migration policy that has been developed 
since the 2000’s as a reaction to the failure of the multicultural model.  
It has been generally accepted that the shift of the responsibility towards the migrants, 
the switch of camps, can be attributed to the rising of the extreme right-wings in 
                                                 
1 Following the example of the Netherlands, also the Belgian embassies and consulates will put 
information packages in all the major migration countries at the disposal of all those who wish to prepare 
themselves for migration to and integration into Flanders. (De Standaard 12/02/2010). 
Europe. Joppke on the other hand points to two opposite ways to integration that belong 
to the mantra of the austere neo-liberalism that frames economic globalisation (Carrera, 
2006, p. 12; Joppke, 2007a, p. 248).  Civic integration on the one hand enforces 
migrants to fit into the new society, and antidiscrimination on the other hand forces 
specific rules upon the host society according to which migrants ought to be offered 
social security. The antidiscrimination laws that were executed in the 2000’s in several 
European countries, form the compensating contribution of the host societies. They 
counterbalance the civic integration programmes that are the responsibility of the 
migrants.  
According to Joppke the emergent gestalt of contemporary European immigrant 
integration in the 2000’s is a peculiar coexistence of civic integration and 
antidiscrimination policies (Joppke, 2007a, p. 247). They are complementary as not 
only the migrants but also the receiving societies must change in the process of 
immigration.  
 
This dual task of civic integration and antidiscrimination reflects a confluence of two 
opposite sites of liberalism where on the one hand equality for all means that 
newcomers can freely integrate into the host society (antidiscrimination) and on the 
other hand a liberalism of power and discipline, with individual citizens not being 
dependent on the welfare state (Joppke, 2007b, p. 16). Therefore, in the globalized 
economy, migrants have to take on the responsibility to release their self-producing and 
self-regulating capacities as an alternative to the redistribution and public welfare. 
Within this strict neoliberal free market economy, social exclusion does not spring from 
moral grounds, but is the result of a body of thought linked to the market economy that 
in a competitive sense wishes to make use of its full potential. That is why ethnic 
minorities, and Islamic dissenters in particular, must firmly assimilate as to keep the 
costs resulting from the protection of our welfare state to an absolute minimum (Joppke, 
2007a, p. 269).  
 
Yet the civic integration programmes in the various countries of the European Union 
did not generate assimilation. Discrimination still exists, not in the least towards second 
generation migrants that are put at a disadvantage through their ethnicity or race. The 
European Union ordered the different member states to make every direct or indirect 
form of discrimination in terms of employment, education, social protection and health 
care, from 2003 punishable by law.  
It is obvious that the antidiscrimination laws, how complementary to the civic 
integration programmes they might seem, are in reality antipodal to civic integration. 
The civic integration policy, as it existed at the beginning of the 2000’s, thwarted the 
model of group bonding, of the community, by putting the power and the ability of the 
individual to the foreground. Civic integration policy was the opposite of “pillarization-
times”. Antidiscrimination laws reaffirm the existence of groups of people that are 
distinguished from others solely on ethnic grounds. 
 
The positive action that promotes diversity in the employed workforce is a logical 
consequence of the EU Race Directive (Joppke, 2007a, p. 259). This intervention wants 
to offer equal opportunities to all sections of the population by – under specific 
circumstances -allowing priorities to people from allochtonous groups. Obviously the 
controversial diversity policy approaches people primarily as members of a group. Its 
very relationship is the most important characteristic of the individual members.  
Various countries of the EU having already taken antidiscrimination measures long 
before the EU Race Directive was introduced, points to the fact that the ambivalence 
was never far-off. In the last decade the focus of migrant policies shifted from the group 
to the individual, from the ethnic community to the individual employee, from authentic 
culture to integrated citizenship, from humanistic communautarism to liberal 
individualism (Entzinger,  2006, p. 125). This shift, these strict rules linked with civic 
integration need to be compensated by antidiscrimination laws.  
Hospitality is inherent to the European tradition; particularly the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom have since long built up a reputation of tolerance and hospitality 
towards strangers. For example, in the Netherlands, but also in Belgium, simultaniously 
a Commission of Equal Treatment and a Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition 
to Racism were founded in 1994 and 1993, to promote equal opportunities and to fight 
any type of exclusion, restriction or preferential treatment based on legally stipulated 
criteria. The Republican identity model of France on the other hand excludes ethnic and 
racial discrimination. But the very reason of its being harder to recognise real 
discrimination in an atmosphere of denial. In the same sense very little ethnic 
immigrants are employed in the public sector which by definition is neutral and equal 
for all. In France the battle against discrimination is curbed by the traditional taboo on 
ethnic and racial categorization (Joppke, 2007a, p. 263).  
 
Integration policy towards islamisation 
 
The pillarization model has failed 
 
The measures that are taken today to promote the integration of migrants do not allow 
any possibilty for the recognition of the cultural identity of Turks, Moroccans and 
Algerians. Initially they were stimulated to integrate into the new society starting from 
their own cultural background; now they are given the responsibility to make 
themselves familiar with the French, the Belgian, the Dutch, the German or the British 
culture. Not even the contemporary diversity policy doesn’t offer them the opportunity 
towards self-affirming in a cultural sense (Husband, 2007).  
The migrants have to initiate loyalty to respect and observe the values and norms of the 
new society. In the past they developed various institutional structures as result of their 
own cultural background, made possible by the model of pillarization. This has 
presently lost its entire meaning. Eventually their institutional participation structures 
could no longer overcome the major problems of ghettoization, unemployment and low 
schooling rates (Entzinger, 2006, p. 135). 
 
The “pillarization concept” had failed mainly because the basic conditions were by no 
means comparable to those of the traditional pillars from the postwar period. First of all 
the position from which the migrant communities had to build up their institutions could 
not be compared to those of the opposing majority. Castles and Miller (2003, 44) have 
already stated that multiculturalism only stands a chance in a society where the diverse 
cultural communities hare an equal loyalty towards that society. Yet this is not the case 
for the migrants who are still attached to their country of origin. Moreover the pillars are 
only productive when they can compete on more or less equal power base. It’s clear that 
the migrant community was not able to cope with the native majority.  
But it is equally important that the differences between the divergent communities are 
not too wide. Scheffer quotes that a shared history, a shared language and even some 
cultural equalities are necessary to bridge the actual existing differences (Scheffer, 
2007, pp. 173-176; Entzinger, 2006, p. 137). Institutional separateness allowing respect 
for cultural diversity, actually veiled ethnocentrism and indifference. On the contrary 
even, institutional separateness excluded migrant groups from what really matters in 
society.      
 
A return to segregation 
 
In the last thirty years the integration policy in Western Europe vis-à-vis the Maghreb 
countries has adopted conflicting twist. Particularly the turnaround from 
multiculturalism to civic integration where the responsibility has shifted from one party 
to the other, can be spectacular. The focus on Islam now is the last step (Qualyle & 
Sonn, 2009, p. 11). 
A number of international factors, such as the economic globalization and its effect on 
employment, the steady advancement of European integration process, the repeated 
actions of Muslim fundamentalism and the steady expansion of the immigration wave, 
all have nourished feelings of fear, threat and insecurity across Western Europe 
(Scheffer ,2007, p. 174; Wouters, 1998). 
 
The construction of Islam as a public issue in Western European countries (Mieri & 
Sala Pala, 2009) makes us believe in the clash of the civilisations myth.  
It is the wave of Islamic terroristic acts since the events of 11 September 2001, i.e. the 
bomb explosions in three Madrid train stations in 2004, the attacks on 7 July 2005 in 
London and the Western answer of ‘The war on terror’ that has brought about an 
inaccessible gap between the West and the Arabic world as well as between migrants 
with an Islamic background and their host country. From that time on we have been 
constructing an image of the Muslims as the “Others” (Quayle & Sonn, 2009; Žižek, 
2002) who are responsible for the ‘clash of civilizations’. Slavoy Žižek however rejects 
this notion of the clash of civilisation. According to him we can rather note clashes 
within each civilisation, related to global capitalism. The Muslim ‘fundamentalists’ not 
only target the excessive freedom of Western consumption and immoral social life; they 
likewise attack the corrupt ‘traditionalist’ regimes in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and 
elsewhere. All those regimes are clearly related to the ‘playground’ of global economic 
interests. ‘Instead of endless analyses of how Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ is intolerant 
towards our liberal societies, and other ‘clash-of-civilisation’ topics, we would refocus 
our attention on the economic background to the conflict —  the clash of economic 
interests’ (Žižek, 2002, 42)2. 
 
Yet the myth is very much alive. In the 2000’s the Islam has been accused as the power 
undermining western values and norms.  The danger was not simply external. This 
became apparent: for instance, in November 2004 when in the Netherlands Mohammed 
Bouyeri, a Muslim born in Amsterdam, killed the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh. The 
dangers of Islam were already present within the Western societies. In addition a 
stereotype image of all newcomers being Muslims arose from the fact that many North 
African migrants indeed do search a wedding partner in their country of origin. 
Migrants from outside Europe are invariably thought to be Turks, Algerians or 
Moroccans.  
The actual impact of Islam on contemporary Western societies is nonetheless very 
limited. Nowadays Muslims make up the ideal scapegoats. In a neoliberal world that 
ought to eliminate each form of ‘otherness’, a phantasmatic fixation on one single 
image of the enemy is very alluring. It stimulates the social cohesion. It invokes the 
imaginary values and sentiments that provide the vital humanistic dynamic which 
renders a meaningful civil society viable. (Husband, 2007).  
 
                                                 
2 The very claim of protecting democracy and human rights must legitimate international interventions. 
Though in such a deep conflict there is only one party who can claim to be humanistarian, the other one is 
the personification of the devil. This latter party are the terrorists. In 2002, after 9/11, the Americans 
started their ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan. At that time, a seven-year-old American girl whose father 
was a pilot fighting in Afghanistan, wrote him a letter. She said “…although she loved her father very 
much, she was ready to let him die, to sacrifice him for her country”. When President Bush quoted these 
lines, they were perceived as a ‘normal’ outburst of American patriotism, according to Žižek. But as a 
kind of experiment, he reverses this simple story and asks us to imagine an Arabic Muslim girl 
pathetically reciting into the camera the same words about her father fighting for the Taliban. It is clear 
what our reaction would be: morbid Muslim fundamentalism that doesn’t stop even at the cruel 
manipulation and exploitation of children. (See: Žižek, S., Welcome to the desert of the real, Verso, 
London/New-York 2002, 43-44) 
Civic integration policy has turned into an assimilation policy. The migrants need to 
acquire the living habits and the values as well as the norms of the European societies. 
This is not spontaneously attributed to Islam. Civic integration means ‘the denial of the 
strong Islamic influence’3. This repressive integration policy has nonetheless a 
contradictural effect. The actual crumbled migrant community is being forced to 
recognise or identify with a closed community united by common religion. Against their 
will they are only being stimulated to create their own world, their own consultative 
structures, their own media and educational institutions. The unspoken temptation is 
hidden towards the religious leaders, such as the imams, to hold their rear rank under 
control (Scheffer, 2007, p. 170). The North African migrants are thus again an ‘entity’ 
that, in spite of the enforced assimilation, keeps on being separated from the native 
majority4. In other words, the separation of the 1970s and 1980s never disappeared.  
 
 
 
 
The success of the integration process             
 
                                                 
3 In October 2009 the Flemish minister for Integration announced that imams, and the highest authority of 
Islamic religion in Belgium, the Muslim Executive, would be involved in his civic integration policy. 
According to the minister ‘we cannot deny the prominent role of Islam in the integration processes, 
although the debate on civic integration should not be narrowed down to a simple debate about Islam’. 
(De Standaard 27 October 2009)   
 
4 Only recently a referendum was voted in Switzerland on the permissibility of minarets, a problem by 
which the Islam was called out to be a national problem, where in reality this was not the case at all.  
On 29 November 2009, 57.5 percent of the Suisse population voted for a constitutional ban on the 
construction of new minarets. Of those who were in favour of the ban 60 percent belonged to the Roman 
Catholic part of the population. They all feared ‘fundamentalism’ and the ‘advancing islamization’ of 
Switzerland.  
Switzerland has four mosques with a minaret. Of the near eight million inhabitants, 350.000 are Muslim, 
mostly Europeans from Bosnia and Kosovo. Only 13 percent of them participates on a regular basis in the 
Friday Prayers. So the actual impact of Islam on the Suisse society is extremely small.   
The short sightedness of the Suisse has caused upheaval all over Europe. It is nonetheless very plausible 
that this badly thought-out decision would not have been different from what the result would have been 
if a referendum was held in other parts of Europe. As if in Europe the tolerance towards Islam has 
reached its limits. That is why so many people take offence against the construction of mosques with 
minarets, as these entail the visible signs of ‘otherness’. The minaret disturbs the well- known townscape 
of churches and cathedrals. As in the debates on the headscarf in France and elsewhere in Europe, the 
minarets are believed to by symbols or signs of an ‘ever advancing’ Islam.   
The outlined history of the migration from the Maghreb countries in the last thirty years 
reflects a succession of failures, which shows that we are now at the point where we 
started from. Moreover, particularly the migrants from the second generation who are 
opposed to an adequate integration. More pronounced than their parents they defend an 
identity that initiates from their culture and religion. They enhance their Islamic roots in 
order to elevate themselves from the majority. They display Islamic religion as an 
unbridgeable gap from Western culture. They are tied up in this tradition where the 
wearing of a headscarf is considered as very important. 
 
What all integration models of the last decennia have in common is that they built 
bridges between the migrants and the native majority. Although the integration has not 
been considered successful, this does not mean that the second and third generation of 
migrants from the Maghreb countries are further removed from the European societies 
in the same way as their parents or grandparents. All these youngsters grew up in a 
Western culture which differs completely from the daily experiences in Morocco, 
Algeria and Turkey. Now they are as familiar with the Western society as are the native 
majorities.  
 
In their variety they are decreasingly homogenous and increasingly resemble the native 
majority. Paradoxically the pressure on the migrants as a group is rising.  
Their marginal social position (unemployed, low education rate, poor housing,…), 
which has remained unchanged through years and generations, is the very spot from 
where they commence the resistance to enforced integration. In a certain way that sort 
of resistance might be constitutive for the emancipation process that all subordinated 
cultures need to go through vis-à-vis the dominant west. When they offer resistance, 
they do so because of the familiarity with the all-embracing power position of the well-
known Western culture. They fight a battle, if necessary by being deliberately 
obstructive, in order to obtain eventually a fulfilling place in that world in which they 
grew up. They succeed in denying the evidence that they are Belgian, Dutch, etc. Those 
young ‘migrants’, educated in Europe, identify with an Arab-Islamic culture in 
protesting against western culture, is the exact opposite of what is expected in terms of 
integration, but it is probably an important step within the process of emancipation. 
They use the roots of their ancestors, the Islam, to manifest successfully themselves. As 
a consequence our attention should shift from the so-called ‘integration problem’ to the 
‘civil or social problem of an integrated society’.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Through the migration history of the past thirty years, the integration process has shifted 
from separateness into institutional integration, eventually to achieve assimilation 
(Entzinger, 2006, p. 16). Though all forms of integration in the past can be reduced to 
the same one-way traffic: migrants are strangers who need to adapt. Should this fail, 
they are left with the sole alternative of exclusion. Against this obstruction migrants 
have no story. They are a powerless party that have to simply accept what has been 
offered to them in generosity (Lorenz, 2006). Immigrants and natives are not equally 
confronted. 
It is important to be aware that the scientific definition of the migration policy problem 
is also subject to a moralistic language use as well. Scholars too are guided by the 
dominant ideological discourse of policy makers (Husband, 2007; Mieri & Sala Pala, 
2009). Walter Lorenz and many others have stressed the huge influence of 
contemporary neo-liberalism, I the same way as in social work practice (Lorenz, 2005). 
‘The core principles of neo-liberalism are ‘less state, more market, more individual 
responsibility’. This neoliberal thought is manifested in the civic integration 
programmes for old and new migrants. These repressive integration programmes fights 
an ideological battle with Islam.  
 
Social workers and civil integration practitioners need to be aware of the fact that the 
key to integration lies in the direction of context, sensitivity, application, and fulsome 
communication – the basic principles of good practices with all clients (Graham, 
Bradshaw & Trew, 2010, pp. 548-549). The focus on Islam as a binding factor for large 
groups of migrants is misleading. The fact hat they are still conceived as such, brings 
individuals who feel disowned and misunderstood in the efforts produced to become a 
participant in the new society.  
Social workers should not focus on the Muslim community as such. Enough problems 
are existing with particular and individual migrants who have nothing to do with the 
Islam. For Tariq Ramadan there are three central pillars: citizenship, identity and sense 
of belonging. Citizenship is what people share who live in the same area. The identity is 
partly influenced by the cultural (and religious) background. But social work can 
contribute a lot to the so-called sense of belonging and create the awareness to citizens 
that they belong and can fully participate in society (Ramadan, 2010, 68-70).  
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